

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE  
WESTERN DIVISION

DeANDREW CHAMBERS,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
VS.	)	No. 14-2418-JDT-dkv
	)	
TERRE FRATESI, ET AL.,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

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ORDER DISMISSING CASE,  
CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH  
AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE

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On June 2, 2014, Plaintiff DeAndrew Chambers, Tennessee Department of Correction prisoner number 300213, an inmate at the South Central Correctional Facility in Clifton, Tennessee, filed a *pro se* complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accompanied by a motion seeking leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) In an order issued on June 4, 2014, the Court granted leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) On November 7, 2014, the Court directed Plaintiff to submit a signed version of his complaint. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff complied by filing a signed copy of the signature page on December 4, 2014. (ECF No. 6.) The Clerk shall record the Defendants as Shelby County Assistant District Attorney General Terre Fratesi; Letifia Cole and Latasha Sloan from the Tennessee Department of Childrens Services; and Memphis Police Officers M. Webb,

Edward Bowen, and J. Fields. Each Defendant is sued in his or her individual and official capacities.

The complaint alleges that, on August 15, 2011, Memphis Police officers responded to a complaint of criminal assault. Fatimah Robinson told the police that her nine-year-old daughter had disclosed that, while she was spending the night with her aunt, Crystal Moore, Plaintiff, who was Ms. Moore's boyfriend, "entered the bedroom were [sic] she slept and touch her inappropriately. It is feather [sic] alleged that Plaintiff came into the room and pulled her shirt and bra down and started sucking on her breast." (ECF No. 1, ¶ 9 at 3.)

Attached to the complaint is a letter from Plaintiff's attorney to Defendant Fratesi, dated August 12, 2102, addressing purported deficiencies in the discovery provided by the State. (*Id.* ¶ 10; *see also* ECF No. 1-3.) Plaintiff also attached a report from the Memphis Child Advocacy Center of an interview of the victim by Defendant Cole. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 11 at 3; *see also* ECF No. 1-4.) Plaintiff alleges that "Defendant contacted his Job and placed in his employer that he was a child predator and should not be working at a place that service children." (ECF No. 1, ¶ 12 at 3.) At the time, Plaintiff was employed at a Wendy's. (*Id.*) The complaint does not disclose whether Plaintiff's employer acted on that information.

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Defendants to remove the arrest report from the NCIS and all other databases, and compensatory and punitive damages. (*Id.* ¶¶ 13-16, at 3-4.)

By way of background, on February 14, 2012, a grand jury in Shelby County, Tennessee, returned an indictment charging Chambers with one count of aggravated sexual

battery. The case was resolved by *nolle prosequi* on October 11, 2013. See <http://jssi.shelbycountyttn.gov/> (Indictment # 12 00765).<sup>1</sup>

The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the complaint—

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be granted, the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), as stated in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied. *Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” *Williams v. Curtin*, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 681). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679; *see also Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without

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<sup>1</sup> The convictions for which Chambers is currently serving sentences are unrelated to the events at issue in this case.

some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).

“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally.” *Hill*, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). “Any complaint that is legally frivolous would *ipso facto* fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” *Id.* (citing *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 328-29).

Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless. Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, a judge does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for frivolousness.

*Id.* at 471 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

“*Pro se* complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” *Williams*, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting *Martin v. Overton*, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). *Pro se* litigants, however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *Wells v. Brown*, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); *see also Brown v. Matauszak*, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of *pro se* complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim

which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting *Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.*, 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))); *Payne v. Sec’y of Treas.*, 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming *sua sponte* dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for her”); cf. *Pliler v. Ford*, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to *pro se* litigants.”); *Young Bok Song v. Gipson*, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of *pro se* litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,<sup>2</sup> a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)

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<sup>2</sup> Section 1983 provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. *Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.*, 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” *Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Fratesi, Cole and Sloan in their official capacities is brought against the State of Tennessee.<sup>3</sup> Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Webb, Bowen and Fields in their official capacities is brought against the City of Memphis.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment has been construed to prohibit citizens from suing their own states in federal court. *Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp.*, 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987); *Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman*, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); *Employees of Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare*, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973); *see also Va. Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart*, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638 (2011) (“A

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<sup>3</sup> The Shelby County District Attorney General is also known as the District Attorney General for the Thirtieth Judicial District at Memphis. The position of District Attorney General is established pursuant to state law. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-7-101 (“Each judicial district shall constitute a district attorney general’s district.”), 8-7-103 (duties). The district attorney generals are part of the executive branch of state government. *State v. Head*, 971 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).

State may waive its sovereign immunity at its pleasure, and in some circumstances Congress may abrogate it by appropriate legislation. But absent waiver or valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain a private person's suit against a State.” (citations omitted)). By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment bars all suits, regardless of the relief sought. *Pennhurst*, 465 U.S. at 100-01. Tennessee has not waived its sovereign immunity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-13-102(a). Moreover, a state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga.*, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002); *Will*, 491 U.S. at 71.

The complaint does not assert a valid claim against Shelby County. When a § 1983 claim is made against a municipality or county, the court must analyze two distinct issues: (1) whether the plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) if so, whether the municipality is responsible for that violation. *Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex.*, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). The second issue is dispositive of Plaintiff's claim against Shelby County.

A local government “cannot be held liable *solely* because it employs a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a *respondeat superior* theory.” *Monell v. Dep't. of Soc. Serv.*, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (emphasis in original); see also *Searcy v. City of Dayton*, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994); *Berry v. City of Detroit*, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994). A municipality cannot be held responsible for a constitutional deprivation unless there is a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation. *Monell*, 436 U.S. at 691-92; *Deaton v.*

*Montgomery Co., Ohio*, 989 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was incurred due to execution of that policy.” *Alkire v. Irving*, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing *Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t*, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “Where a government ‘custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels,’ such a custom may still be the subject of a § 1983 suit.” *Alkire*, 330 F.3d at 815 (quoting *Monell*, 436 U.S. at 690-91). The policy or custom “must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” *Searcy*, 38 F.3d at 286 (quoting *Polk Co. v. Dodson*, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981) (citation omitted)). “[T]he touchstone of ‘official policy’ is designed ‘to distinguish acts of the *municipality* from acts of *employees* of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible.’” *City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik*, 485 U.S. 112, 138 (1988) (quoting *Pembaur v. Cincinnati*, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 (1986)).

Although civil rights plaintiffs are not required to plead the facts demonstrating municipal liability with particularity, *see Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit*, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993), the complaint must be sufficient to put the municipality on notice of the plaintiff’s theory of liability, *see, e.g., Fowler v. Campbell*, No. 3:06CV-P610-H, 2007 WL 1035007, at \*2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2007); *Oliver v. City of Memphis*, No. 04-2074-B, 2004 WL 3316242, at \*4 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2004); *cf. Raub v.*



*Corr. Med. Servs., Inc.*, No. 06-13942, 2008 WL 160611, at \*2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint contained conclusory allegations of a custom or practice); *Chidester v. City of Memphis*, No. 02-2556 MA/A, 2006 WL 1421099, at \*3 (W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2005). The complaint does not allege that Plaintiff suffered any injury arising from an unconstitutional policy or custom of Shelby County.

The complaint also does not state a valid claim for false arrest. A Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest requires an arrest without probable cause. *See, e.g., Parsons v. City of Pontiac*, 533 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2008); *Crockett v. Cumberland Coll.*, 316 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Today it is well established that an arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.”). Probable cause exists where a suspect is arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant<sup>4</sup> or where “‘facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offense.’” *Crockett*, 316 F.3d at 580 (quoting *Michigan v. DeFillippo*, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)); *see also Wolfe v. Perry*, 412 F.3d 707, 717 (6th Cir. 2005) (“probable cause necessary to justify an arrest is defined as ‘whether at that moment [of the arrest] the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the

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<sup>4</sup> *Baker v. McCollan*, 443 U.S. 137, 142-46 (1979) (arrest and detention for three days under warrant issued in plaintiff’s name but meant for his brother did not state a Fourth Amendment claim); *see Masters v. Crouch*, 872 F.2d 1248, 1252-53 (6th Cir. 1989) (dismissing claim where warrant issued in error).

[arrestee] had committed or was committing an offense” (quoting *Beck v. Ohio*, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)) (alterations in original)); *Gardenhire v. Schubert*, 205 F.3d 303, 315 (6th Cir. 2000). The vague and conclusory allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint do not set forth any facts indicating that, at the time Plaintiff was arrested, Defendants lacked probable cause to believe he had committed a crime. The attachments to the complaint reflect that the victim told Defendant Cole, in the presence of Defendants Sloan and Webb, that Plaintiff had pulled up her shirt and sucked on her breast. (See ECF No. 1-4 at 1.) Although Plaintiff denied the allegation, (*see id.* at 5), the police were entitled to conclude that the victim was credible.<sup>5</sup>

That an arrest does not result in a conviction does not necessarily mean that the arrest itself was unlawful. Because the relevant inquiry concerns the information available to the officer at the time of the arrest, “[a] valid arrest based upon then-existing probable cause is not vitiated if the suspect is later found innocent.” *Criss v. City of Kent*, 867 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir. 1988); *see also Baker*, 443 U.S. at 145 (“The Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested. If it did, § 1983 would provide a cause of action for every defendant acquitted—indeed, for every suspect released.”). Here, the criminal case was resolved by *nolle prosequi*, which does not necessarily mean that the charge was found to be unfounded. That disposition appears to have been pursuant to a plea agreement resolving all the criminal charges against Plaintiff.

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<sup>5</sup> The analysis in the text assumes that Plaintiff was arrested without a warrant. For the reasons stated below, it appears likely that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant that issued after the indictment was returned. In that case, any false arrest claim would fail as a matter of law.

Plaintiff's false arrest claim is also time barred. The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action is the "state statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions under the law of the state in which the § 1983 claim arises." *Eidson v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs.*, 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007); *see also Wilson v. Garcia*, 471 U.S. 261, 275-76 (1985). The limitations period for § 1983 actions arising in Tennessee is the one-year limitations provision found in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a). *Roberson v. Tennessee*, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005); *Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ.*, 215 F.3d 543, 547 (6th Cir. 2000); *Berndt v. Tennessee*, 796 F.2d 879, 883 (6th Cir. 1986). A claim for false arrest or imprisonment accrues at the time of arrest or, at the latest, when detention without legal process ends. *Wallace v. Kato*, 549 U.S. 384, 391-92, 397 (2007); *Fox v. DeSoto*, 489 F.3d 227, 233, 235 (6th Cir. 2007).

Although the complaint does not state when Plaintiff was arrested, the attachments reflect that the victim was interviewed on August 23, 2011, and Plaintiff was interviewed on September 8, 2011. The online docket for the Shelby County General Sessions and Criminal Courts does not reflect an arrest date for the aggravated sexual battery charge. A warrant was issued for Plaintiff's arrest on February 15, 2012, the day after the indictment for aggravated sexual battery was returned. Although it is not clear when Plaintiff was arrested, he posted bond on March 4, 2012. Because Plaintiff's complaint was postmarked more than one year later, on May 29, 2014 (*see* ECF No. 1-1), any false arrest claim is time barred.

The complaint does not sufficiently specify Plaintiff's claim against whichever Defendant recommended to Plaintiff's employer that he be terminated. There is no allegation

that that action violated Plaintiff's rights under the United States Constitution. Any state-law claim is time barred. The statute of limitation for slander in Tennessee is six months, Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-103, and the statute of limitations for written libel is one year, *id.* § 28-3-104(a)(1).

Although Plaintiff's claim for malicious prosecution is timely, it is meritless. The requirements for a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 are as follows:

The Sixth Circuit “recognize[s] a separate constitutionally cognizable claim of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment,” which “encompasses wrongful investigation, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration.” *Barnes v. Wright*, 449 F.3d 709, 715-16 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The “tort of malicious prosecution” is “entirely distinct” from that of false arrest, as the malicious-prosecution tort “remedies detention accompanied not by absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process.” *Wallace v. Kato*, 549 U.S. 384, 390, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 166 L. Ed. 2d 973 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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To succeed on a malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983 when the claim is premised on a violation of the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must prove the following: First, the plaintiff must show that a criminal prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and that the defendant “ma[d]e, influence[d], or participate[d] in the decision to prosecute.” *Fox v. DeSoto*, 489 F.3d 227, 237 (6th Cir. 2007); *see also McKinley v. City of Mansfield*, 404 F.3d 418, 444 (6th Cir. 2005); *Darrah v. City of Oak Park*, 255 F.3d 301, 312 (6th Cir. 2001); *Skousen v. Brighton High Sch.*, 305 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2002). Second, because a § 1983 claim is premised on the violation of a constitutional right, the plaintiff must show that there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution, *Fox*, 489 F.3d at 237; *Voyticky*, 412 F.3d at 675. Third, the plaintiff must show that, “as a consequence of a legal proceeding,” the plaintiff suffered a “deprivation of liberty,” as understood in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, apart from the initial seizure. *Johnson v. Knorr*, 477 F.3d 75, 81 (3d Cir. 2007); *see Gregory v. City of Louisville*, 444 F.3d 725, 748-50 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing the scope of “Fourth Amendment protections ... beyond an initial seizure,” including “continued detention without probable cause”); *cf. Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477, 484, 114 S. Ct.

2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994) (“[U]nlike the related cause of action for false arrest or imprisonment, [an action for malicious prosecution] permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process.”). Fourth, the criminal proceeding must have been resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. *Heck*, 512 U.S. at 484, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (“One element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.”).

*Sykes v. Anderson*, 625 F. 3d 294, 308-09 (6th Cir. 2010) (additional citations and footnote omitted); *see also Marcilis v. Twp. of Redford*, 693 F.3d 589, 604 (6th Cir. 2012) (“In order to prove malicious prosecution under federal law, a plaintiff must show, at a minimum, that there is no probable cause to justify an arrest or a prosecution.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Although the favorable termination requirement appears to have been satisfied in this case, Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege the other elements of a malicious prosecution claim. The victim’s statement that Plaintiff molested her is sufficient to provide probable cause and to defeat a claim for malicious prosecution. *See Hann v. Michigan*, No. 05-CV-71347-DT, 2007 WL 1322328, at \*7 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2007) (victim’s statement provided probable cause under Michigan law) (report and recommendation), *adopted*, 2007 WL 1565465 (E.D. Mich. May 29, 2007).

Plaintiff cannot sue Defendant Fratesi for money damages. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for actions taken in initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions because that conduct is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” *Imbler v. Pachtman*, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). “A prosecutor’s decision to initiate a prosecution, including the decision to file a criminal complaint or seek an arrest warrant, is

protected by absolute immunity.” *Howell v. Sanders*, 668 F.3d 344, 351 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff’s claim for money damages against Defendant Fratesi is barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. *Id.* at 427-28; *Burns v. Reed*, 500 U.S. 478, 490-492 (1991); *Grant v. Hollenbach*, 870 F.2d 1135, 1137 (6th Cir. 1989); *Jones v. Shankland*, 800 F.2d 77, 80 (6th Cir. 1986). Therefore, she cannot be sued for malicious prosecution. *O’Neal v. O’Neal*, 23 F. App’x 368, 370 (6th Cir. 2001); *see also Spurlock v. Thompson*, 330 F.3d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that “prosecutors are absolutely immune from many malicious prosecution claims”); *Roybal v. State of Tenn. Dist. Attorney’s Office*, 84 F. App’x 589 (6th Cir. 2003).

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint to avoid a *sua sponte* dismissal under the PLRA. *LaFountain v. Harry*, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); *see also Brown v. R.I.*, No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at \*1 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. *Brown*, 2013 WL 646489, at \*1; *Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States*, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); *Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.*, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“*in forma pauperis* plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile”); *Curley v.*

*Perry*, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”). The deficiencies in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured by amendment for the reasons previously stated.

Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). The claims against Defendants Fratesi, Cole and Sloan in their official capacities, and against Defendant Fratesi in her individual capacity, are also DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court must also consider whether an appeal by Plaintiff in this case would be taken in good faith. The good faith standard is an objective one. *Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The test for whether an appeal is taken in good faith is whether the litigant seeks appellate review of any issue that is not frivolous. *Id.* It would be inconsistent for a district court to determine that a complaint should be dismissed prior to service on the Defendants, but has sufficient merit to support an appeal *in forma pauperis*. See *Williams v. Kullman*, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983). The same considerations that lead the Court to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim also compel the conclusion that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.

Therefore, it is CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal in this matter by Plaintiff would not be taken in good faith.

The Court must also address the assessment of the \$505 appellate filing fee if Plaintiff nevertheless appeals the dismissal of this case. A certification that an appeal is not taken in good faith does not affect an indigent prisoner plaintiff's ability to take advantage of the installment procedures contained in § 1915(b). *See McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997). *McGore* sets out specific procedures for implementing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b). Therefore, the Plaintiff is instructed that if he wishes to take advantage of the installment procedures for paying the appellate filing fee, he must comply with the procedures set out in *McGore* and § 1915(a)(2) by filing an updated *in forma pauperis* affidavit and a current, certified copy of his inmate trust account for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the notice of appeal.

For analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of future filings, if any, by Plaintiff, this is the first dismissal of one of his cases as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. This “strike” shall take effect when judgment is entered. *Coleman v. Tollefson*, 733 F.3d 175, 177-78 (6th Cir. 2013), *cert. granted*, 82 U.S.L.W. 3675 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014) (Nos. 13-1333, 13A985).

The Clerk is directed to prepare a judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ **James D. Todd**  
JAMES D. TODD  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE